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Introduction:  Analytic Philosophy as a Post-structuralism?  
 
Point of Departure 
This Special Issue of Konturen explores above all two relationships, which may also be 
nonrelationships: those between nature and culture (qua human artifice) and between 
the continental and (Viennese-Anglo-American) analytic traditions in philosophy.    
The broad problem of the wavering limit between what is natural and what 
artificial, especially as concerns the definition and organization of the human, is one that 
interests and troubles our times in manifold and manifest ways, in the domains of 
political and cultural-identity ideology, technology, ecology, ethics, aesthetics, and on 
and on.  In the context of Konturen, the thematization of this limit functions, on the one 
hand, as a displaced extension of the reflection on the border between religion and 
politics (or Church and State) that comprised our opening volume.   For—either 
surreptitiously or candidly—nature constitutes often enough (and always ideologically) 
our stand-in for religion or God (as a kind of literal absolute, whether as endowed with 
spirit or posited as objective foundation), while artifice frequently carries the sense of a 
"mere" politics or human disposition of power (qua figural, derivative, relative).  This 
power is understood implicitly as inauthenticity, except when the constellation is 
reversed, such that nature as reality signifies the play of power while artifice or culture 
functions as a kind of religion (in a positive or negative sense).   In the contributions 
below, on the other hand, we pursue the limits of the nature/culture opposition in its 
relative independence from this religio-political problematic, which we leave here in the 
background.   More particularly, the individual essays examine the nature/culture 
opposition critically in the guises of nature versus arbitrary convention, lived experience 
in tension with theory, essentialism in competition with constructivism, actuality in 
relation to possibility, reality as complemented by fiction, humanity in view of its robotic 
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simulation, performative improvisation as supplement of fixed musical composition, and 
aesthetic demonstration qua displacement of aesthetic judgment.   
The second main (and perhaps only apparent or conventionally established) 
binary opposition we explore here, the continental/analytic divide, is of pressing interest 
today because both philosophical (sub)traditions are at generational and theoretical 
turning points where their contours are becoming indistinct, their projects perhaps 
uncertain.   On the continental side, the generation of French philosophy that produced 
the post-structuralist and post-modernist developments in continental philosophy, 
including Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Jean-François Lyotard, Gilles Deleuze and 
others, is almost entirely gone, lost to time and death.  The thinking produced by this 
generation, often summarized (when one effaces the significant internal conflicts and 
differences of position and project) as an anti-humanistic anti-philosophy, is under 
sustained attack from a number of perspectives ranging from the nouveaux philosophes to 
the Lacanian Marxism of Slavoj Zizek to the systematic philosophy of Alain Badiou, 
which in fact incorporates certain important motifs from analytic philosophy (these 
prominently including the importance of mathematized sciences).   The Frankfurt School 
tradition of "critical theory," to take another prominent example, faces the aging of its 
second and even third generations, and its contours (especially in the case of Walter 
Benjamin, but also that of Theodor Adorno) have become unclear partly through its 
very success: the multiplication of readings and appropriations from different 
perspectives.1  In short, the schools and movements that have comprised and carved up 
late twentieth century continental philosophy seem to have largely run their course.   
The analytic tradition, for its part, is marked by internal discontinuities that have 
become increasingly pronounced.  For example, on the one hand, the difference 
between the original anti-essentialist impulse of its "linguistic turn" and its more recent 
essentialist direction (since Kripke) appears potentially more significant than the 
difference between that original impulse and the kindred impulse in much of the 
twentieth century continental tradition (at least after Husserl)—see the contributions by 
Paul M. Livingston and Samuel C. Wheeler III below, which agree on this point.  Further, 
the very difference between the analytic and continental traditions becomes quasi-
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irrelevant in the face of certain political concerns like those of feminism, as Bonnie Mann 
argues here, which divide each tradition from itself.   
Such a moment of uncertainty is a propitious one for the reconsideration of how 
the continental and analytic traditions relate to one another, where their mutual 
disregard comes from, what might justify or contest the legitimacy of this disregard, and 
so on.  And indeed, such reconsideration is under way in rich, recent philosophical work 
along the continental/analytic divide.   Richard Rorty has traced the division to the 
Kantian distinction between intuitions and concepts, the related distinction between 
reflexive and determinant judgments, and the nineteenth century debates between 
Romantics and positivists that turned around these distinctions.  Rorty proposes, as is 
well known, a return to the pragmatist approach in an attempt to avoid the dichotomies 
that lead to, and sustain, these debates, which he finds extended in the "literary" and 
"scientific" cultures of continental and analytic philosophy respectively.   Michael 
Friedman develops a similar genealogy of the continental/analytic divide, tracing it to the 
conflict between the natural scientific orientation of Marburg Neo-Kantianism and the 
focus on Geisteswissenschaften of the Southwestern School.  Andrew Cutrofello has 
recently argued, against Rorty's proposed pragmatist resolution (which Cutrofello sees 
as effacing or repressing real incompatibilities), that the tensions between the 
continental and analytic approaches concern fundamental and irreconcilable differences 
about what it means to do philosophy at all.2   
 Why, against this background, have we attempted to organize a Special Issue 
around the connection between the nature/culture question and the analytic/continental 
one?  We have two principal reasons for bringing together these two binary 
oppositions.  Our double suspicion or hypothesis is that the second binary here is often 
organized by the first either in an internal or in an external sense.  By internally, I mean 
to refer to what might be a real and significant difference, and to suggest that—
especially with regard to the theory of language—the analytic tradition tends to 
naturalize while the continental tradition culturalizes.  The analytic tradition would thus 
situate language by and large within nature and in continuity with it (in a way that is linked 
with certain historically Enlightenment tendencies, as transformed by nineteenth century 
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positivism and evolutionary theory).  Analytic philosophy has, after all, remained closer 
to the natural sciences than continental philosophy, and indeed it began with positivist 
programs.  The continental tradition, in contrast, would tend to situate language within 
culture, or to understand language as the eruption of a radical break with nature (taking 
seriously the insights of European aestheticism of the late nineteenth century, such as 
Oscar Wilde's provocative claim that nature imitates art), as for example in the 
Saussurean structuralist notion of the arbitrariness of the signifier.  The Lacanian notion 
of language as a traumatic disruption and loss of the Real of jouissance would be one 
example of such an approach, but it would be possible to cite many others, as well.3    
In a more external, implicit sense and on a more ideological plane, it seems that 
the nature/artifice disjunction organizes stereotypical perspectives adopted by each of 
these traditions toward the other, but in ways that are frequently inverted.  For 
example, to those immersed in and committed to the continental tradition, analytic 
philosophy often appears no doubt as somewhat "artificial"—in its interest in formalized 
languages, for example, and in the privilege it seems to grant to logic—while continental 
thought appears (implicitly) as more "natural," or "real," and so on.  Inversely, analytic 
philosophy can appear as bound to "nature," maintaining a literalist concern with reliable 
reference and communicative accuracy, as well as to the uncritically accepted values of 
natural science, while continental philosophy would claim to be appropriately 
comfortable with figurality, culture, the transcendental, and so on.  Symmetrically, a 
sympathy for analytic philosophy can induce one to view continental philosophy as lost 
in the artifices of culture, metaphorical language, mere indirect language, and so on, or 
on the other hand as incapable of escaping the natural limitations of irrationality and 
confusion.   
If either the internal or external determinations of the continental/analytic divide 
in terms of the nature/culture opposition (or both) have some degree of historical 
reality or reliability, that is if they actually take place, according to our hypothesis, then 
perhaps the contributions below can serve a broad positive function.  Perhaps the non-
conversation or non-relation, the mutually disavowing silence, that still largely reigns 
between the two traditions or trajectories within twentieth century philosophy can be 
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mitigated, the silence induced to speak and the disavowal lifted, by posing the question 
of this relation between nature and culture, especially concerning language, in both 
traditions at once and in relation to one another.   
This is not to say that one unified tradition would necessarily be better than two 
separate ones, of course, as if unity were always to be preferred to disunity.   For 
example, it may well turn out that the inscriptions of nature and culture each into the 
other are both equally necessary, while the philosophical consequences of each 
inscription remain mutually incompatible.  Nor is it to assume that we will necessarily 
consolidate the separate identities of each tradition by reflection on their 
interrelationships.  Indeed, if we have supposed that such separate identities exist on a 
significant level, we may see this supposition crumble, the relative internal coherence of 
each tradition dissolve or become relativized, by means of a persistent examination of 
their interrelationships in terms of the nature/culture polarity.   The point is simply that 
it could be useful to come to an increased clarity about what we mean when we talk 
about the two traditions of continental and analytic philosophy.   
 
On the Limits of Structuralism: Nature and Convention 
We begin with the essay by Paul M. Livingston, "The Breath of Sense: Language, 
Structure, and the Paradox of Origin."   This essay condenses and elaborates upon the 
perspective Livingston has developed at length in an impressively wide-ranging and 
clarifying recent book, Philosophy and the Vision of Language (New York: Routledge, 
2008), a study of language in the analytic tradition and in the work of Martin Heidegger.   
This essay and book function below as the point of departure for an exchange (twice 
around) between Livingston and Samuel C. Wheeler III, one of the most important 
participants in the broader discussion of the analytic-continental relationship to date 
(see his book Deconstruction as Analytic Philosophy [Stanford: Stanford UP, 2000]).    
Livingston begins by confirming that the tendency toward naturalism is indeed 
pervasive in contemporary analytic philosophy.  He goes on to argue, however, that this 
naturalism is most often based on a misreading of W.V.O. Quine, and of the analogous 
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insights in Wittgenstein concerning the rule-following paradox, both of which amount 
for Livingston to a critique of the structuralist view of language.  
In order to develop this view of Quine, Livingston shows that the object of 
Quine's critical reflections on Carnap from the 1934 lectures up through "Two Dogmas 
of Empiricism" in 1950 and beyond is the structuralist picture of language in the 
specifically conventionalist form that it assumed in the work of Rudolf Carnap, Quine's 
forerunner, master, and opponent.   For a structuralist view, such as Livingston finds in 
both Carnap and in the French structuralism descending from Saussure, "language as a 
whole consists in a system or structure of rules governing the intercombination and 
regular use of signs."  While Quine criticizes the conventionalist version of such a 
structuralist account of language, his critique equally renders naturalism impossible, 
Livingston argues, despite Quine's own partial self-misunderstanding concerning the 
ultimate implications of his own fundamental insight.4  To try to replace Carnap's 
conventionalism with (a still structuralist) naturalism in the name of Quine is therefore 
to miss the point of Quine's fundamental insights into language.   According to Quine's 
thesis on the "indeterminacy of translation," it is not possible to construct the system of 
rules underlying the "meanings" of words in a language without making any number of 
arbitrary decisions.  What Quine had (re)discovered and mobilized against Carnap's 
conventionalist theory, writes Livingston, was the irreducible "gap between any 
systematic description of the 'structure of language' in terms of rules or norms and the 
actuality of its practice," or again "a necessary and ineliminable gap between the lived 
actuality of any language—what we intuitively grasp from within as the meaning of its 
terms—and anything that we might describe as its constitutive underlying structure." 
This gap between description of structure and the facts of its use remains, even if we 
conceive the facts to be natural rather than conventional.  
Analytic philosophy, then, is divided internally between conventionalist and 
naturalist forms of structuralism, but its deepest insights push it in the direction of (what 
I am calling here) a "post-structuralism" (not necessarily entirely coextensive with what 
we know under that name) or an "anti-structuralism."  In his discussion of Martin 
Heidegger, Livingston tries to show that Heidegger's attempt to explore language from a 
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situation that is neither inside nor simply outside, i.e. to speak "of" or "from" language 
rather than simply "about" it, is a promising point of departure for the kind of thinking 
about language that Quine's critique of Carnap, as well as Wittgenstein's unfolding of the 
rule-following paradox, show to be necessary as an alternative to the "structuralist" 
conception of language.   
In his responses to Livingston's piece, Samuel Wheeler III proposes a defense of 
naturalist structuralism in the form of Donald Davidson's theory of language.  He 
emphasizes that the naturalism and empiricism of both Quine and Davidson were 
mobilized in order to negate and avoid essentialism rather than structuralism per se.  
Whereas Wheeler sees the thesis on indeterminacy in Quine and Davidson (and 
Derrida) as being motivated by this opposition to essentialism, Livingston responds in 
turn by reasserting that the insight into the rift between the universal and the particular 
dimensions of language itself motivates a critique of both empiricist and essentialist,  
both naturalist and conventionalist approaches to the development of a semantic theory 
in terms of a structuralist conception of language.  
 We move next to an examination of the nature/culture opposition within a 
feminist philosophy, for which the opposition between analytic and continental 
philosophy becomes, strikingly, irrelevant.  Bonnie Mann's article, "What Should 
Feminists Do About Nature?" pursues the question of naturalism and conventionalism 
not with respect to meaning in general, but to the specific meanings (and practices) 
associated with gender.  Mann explores the conflicts between naturalist essentialism and 
historicist constructivism principally here by way of Simone de Beauvoir's The Second 
Sex.  Through her reconsideration of Simone de Beauvoir, Mann tries to remind us that 
"nature" functions not just as a historical-political problem for feminism in the 
determination of gender-categories through enduring and violently constraining 
conventions of thought and behavior (hypostasized by essentialism as "natural"), but also 
as an ontological problem that women and men share. Namely, we are all inscribed, 
diversely, in an indifferent nature with respect to which we need to exercise our  
freedom, i.e., to work, in order to, among other things and for the time being, survive 
on this earth.  Mann argues further that consideration of the latter, ontological 
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dimension of "nature," which feminism often (understandably) loses sight of, is the only 
way of gaining an adequate understanding of the former, political one.   
De Beauvoir thus reveals not just historically given oppressive conventions about 
"nature"—and she is most often understood as a constructivist of this sort—but "the 
fundamental paradox of the human condition, with being nature and yet being the kinds 
of creatures who experience ourselves at a certain distance from nature."  More 
specifically, on Mann's attentive reading, de Beauvoir enables us to see how the 
reductive choice between essentialism and constructivism is conditioned precisely by an 
unwillingness or incapacity to deal with, to suffer, this paradox.  To be sure, the 
historically constituted distribution of this paradoxical naturalness/artificiality across the 
sexual difference— i.e. the association of women with nature and of men with the 
transcendence of nature that is determined as the proper of the human—requires 
relentless demystifying critique.  Yet the reification of the alternative between 
essentialism and constructivism amounts for Mann to another, albeit significantly 
different, form of the evasion of this paradoxical naturalness/artificiality of all humanity.   
In a way that is perhaps analogous to Livingston's call for a "critical" reflection on 
language that would avoid the choice between naturalism and constructivism, Mann 
broaches a path that combines the acknowledgement of being-in-nature with historical-
political understanding by placing in question the exclusive reign of the concept of 
causality in determining the relationships between historical and natural existence.   
 
Unnatural Nature and the Living Dead 
Our next two contributions examine sites of the passage between the natural 
and the unnatural (as between organic and mechanical, actual and possible, literal and 
figural) in moments of the interpenetration of life and death.    
Catrin Misselhorn's essay, "Empathy and Dyspathy with Androids," explores the 
limits where empathy with humanlike objects (automata, robots, etc.) shades into a 
feeling of uncanniness, an eerie distaste when androids become human, all too human.  
Drawing on philosophical, literary, cinematic, and neuropsychological sources, she 
proposes an explanatory model of these phenomena in terms of "imaginative 
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perception."  The crossing between natural, organic humanity and artificial, mechanical 
humanity, or the passage between humanity as animated subjectivity and its simulation 
by an inanimate object here takes on affective and aesthetic dimensions whose negative 
side emerges where death begins to impinge upon life: where their similarity threatens 
to become an identity.   
While Misselhorn develops a philosophical psychology of our responses to 
artificial humans that frequently figure as living death in fiction and cinema, Martin Klebes 
examines the inscription of contemporary analytic philosophy in contemporary literary 
forms that thematically (and autobiographically) engage with problems of death and 
mourning.  More specifically, Klebes interprets the reappearance of David K. Lewis's 
theory of possible worlds  within the fictional space of Jacques Roubaud's lyrical 
production.  Roubaud's poems, Klebes argues, "mark the vertiginous ability of literary 
fiction . . .  to re-inscribe—or, as we might put it: to re-fictionalize—the very theory 
that would assign fiction a particular spot in its own philosophical architectonic."   
What spot is concerned here?  On the one hand, Lewis's "modal realism" 
includes in his ontology not only the actual, but all of possibility. The "worlds" of mere 
possibility that might more conventionally be characterized as fictional or figural now 
take on a virtually unheard-of literalness.  On the other hand, Lewis takes fictional 
discourse not to constitute possible worlds, but only to refer to them (and this because 
possible worlds must be devoid of contradiction whereas fiction can well include 
contradiction).   Lewis thus in a sense excludes fictionality from possibility, giving the 
former a purely figural and derivative rather than constitutive status.  Lewis controls and 
limits the range of metaphoricity and unreality in this way by rendering them secondary, 
along with the contradictoriness they include (for example simply by virtue of being 
neither quite real nor simply possible)—a contradictoriness that was also characteristic 
of the androids in Misselhorn's essay, as non-human humans.   Because fiction can 
include contradiction, it has the power to make the impossible appear possible; to 
protect possible worlds from impossibility, fiction must not be endowed with world-
constituting force.  
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In the elegiac poetic fictions of Roubaud, however, the poet entertains the 
possibility of his (in actuality) deceased wife's survival in another, possible world.   To 
figure the possible as the (survival of the) dead is to figure the possibility of an 
impossibility, including one's own (a motif of which Heidegger makes much in his analysis 
of being-unto-death, as one will recall).  What such a figuration reveals, according to 
Klebes, is "the dark heart of [Lewis's ontological] paradise": "the promise of possibility 
goes hand in hand with radically isolating each world and precluding access to it from 
any other realm."  The contradictory fictional address of a deceased beloved across the 
abyss between worlds (actual and possible) reveals an actual dimension of 'our world' 
that is at once a figural haunting, a being haunted by figures and a being figurally haunted 
by those we have lost, a dimension Lewis's modal realism both excludes (in excluding 
contradiction from worlds and in placing fiction in a merely referential secondariness 
with respect to possible worlds) and brings into relief.   Roubaud's fictionally performed 
impingement of impossibility on possibility unsettles Lewis's 'modal realism' precisely 
while illustrating its formidable resources.  
 
Music Between Norm and Act  
With our last two contributions, we turn to the sphere of music.  Lawrence 
Kramer's essay, "Running the Gamut: Music, the Aesthetic, and Wittgenstein's Ladder," 
explores the relationship between the aesthetic theory of the "continental" philosopher 
Kant and the "analytic" philosopher Wittgenstein.  Kramer shows how Wittgenstein's 
thought about aesthetics in terms of "demonstratives"—verbal and other acts in which 
showing exceeds telling—displaces the Kantian problematic of aesthetic judgement.  
Kramer's judicious account indicates, however, not only the shifts of emphasis but also 
the striking degree of continuity (to some degree against Wittgenstein's claims).   The 
apparent artificiality or unreality of Kantian aesthetic judgment from a Wittgensteinian 
point of view is not quite so easy to separate from what functions as the naturalness or 
ordinary reality of the demonstratives with which Wittgenstein would replace them.   
On the other hand, both Wittgenstein's and Kant's views on the aesthetic appear on 
Kramer's account as, in a sense, artificially or unrealistically limiting the realm of 
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aesthetic appreciation to the universal and nonconceptual.   Kramer argues that 
aesthetic appreciation cannot be strictly limited to demonstrative acts as displaced 
forms of aesthetic judgment in the Kantian sense.   Demonstratives elaborate 
themselves into other gestural and discursive modalities in the course of the unfolding 
of the aesthetic: "the demonstrative does more than show; it enjoins.  In principle the 
demonstrative may become the descriptive may become the interpretive.  The effects of 
aesthetic judgment run the gamut."  This gamut includes the repeated passage through 
singularity, as Kramer puts it in a striking definition of the aesthetic in (almost) 
Wittgensteinian terms : "The aesthetic is that which becomes singular and cognitive by 
means, and only by means, of originary demonstratives that are neither singular nor 
cognitive."    
Finally, this Special Issue closes with a multimedial, musical-philosophical essay by 
Marcel Cobussen, Henrik Frisk, and Bart Weijland on improvisation.  The authors 
conceptualize improvisation in terms of two principal models.   On the one hand, they 
draw on nonlinear dynamical systems theory, along the lines of the "butterfly effect" 
developed by Edward Lorenz, the mathematician, meteorologist, and chaos-theoretician.  
On the other hand, the authors invoke "continental" philosophy to conceptualize 
improvisation as the active-passive deconstruction (Derrida) and/or deterritorialization/ 
reterritorialization (Deleuze) of the binary oppositions between composer and 
performer, innovation and repetition, order and chaos, and individual and community, 
among others.  In terms of the essay by Livingston with which this Special Issue opens, 
improvisation is a composition-performance—not simply musical—that finds its place 
somewhere between the rules or norms dictated by a given composition and the 
concrete realization in a performance that would not be understood as co-constituting 
its compositional basis.  In short, improvisation intervenes between art and nature.    
 




                                                 
1 Oddly, reconsiderations of the continental-analytic divide seem to have had little space 
in German Studies, despite the fact that German Studies seems like one "logical" or 
"natural" place for them to occur, since after all analytic philosophy is as Viennese in 
origins as it is Anglo-American, a point Michael Dummett has emphasized.   
2 Richard Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism (Essays: 1972-1980) (Minneapolis: U of 
Minnesota P, 1982); Michael Friedman, A Parting of the Ways: Carnap, Cassirer, and 
Heidegger (Chicago: Open Court, 2000); Andrew Cutrofello, Continental Philosophy: a 
Contemporary Introduction (New York and London: Routledge, 2005), discusses these 
predecessors 1-30; 396-416.   See also the works of Stanley Cavell beginning with Must 
We Mean What We Say? (New York: Scribner, 1969).   For important examinations of 
the relationship between Donald Davidson's thought and contemporary literary theory, 
see Reed Way Dasenbrock, Truth and Consequences: Intentions, Conventions, and the New 
Thematics (University Park: Pennsylvania State U P, 2001) and Samuel C. Wheeler, III, 
Deconstruction as Analytic Philosophy (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2000). 
3 Such a view would perhaps be compatible with the schemas noted above that divide 
analytic from continental philosophy along the divergence between Kantian determinant 
and reflexive judgement.  If culture is to nature in twentieth century philosophy as 
concept to image in Kant, then the subsumption of an image under a concept, which 
unifies concept with image and thereby asserts the compatibility of concept with image, 
is tantamount to the inscription of culture (including language) in nature.  In contrast, 
the (unending) search for a concept that would accord with a given image, which is the 
operation of Kantian reflexive judgment, is tantamount to the acknowledgement of the 
radical separation of culture (including language) from nature.  Reflexion, which is 
already the passage through potentially adequate conceptual models for an enduringly 
incomprehensible image, would be culture itself in exile from a nature that can only 
appear in cultural forms, and then only by showing up missing.  As reflexive and 
determinant judgment are both complementary and at odds with one another, so too, 
perhaps, are the two traditions that descend from them.   
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4 Bill Martin comes to similar conclusions about Quine's self-misunderstanding in 
"Analytic Philosophy's Narrative Turn: Quine, Rorty, Davidson," in Reed Way 
Dasenbrock, ed., Literary Theory After Davidson (University Park: Pennsylvania State UP, 
1993), 124-43.   
